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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SHADUR, Senior District Judge: 
 
Eric Scott Nicholsberg ("Nicholsberg") appeals a district 
court's denial of his motion, brought under the Federal 
Arbitration Act (the "Act," 9 U.S.C. SS 3-4), to stay a breach 
of contract action and to compel arbitration of the claim 
brought against him in that action by First Liberty 
Investment Group ("First Liberty"). First Liberty had 
initiated its lawsuit to recover money damages stemming 
from Nicholsberg's alleged breach of an employment 
agreement. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the 
district court's order and remand to that court so that it 
may stay the action and order the parties to proceed to 
arbitration. 
 
Facts1 
 
We briefly summarize the uncontroverted essential facts. 
Other relevant facts that fit better into the substantive legal 
discussion will be set out later in this opinion. 
 
In February 1996 Nicholsberg began his association with 
First Liberty, a broker-dealer registered with the National 
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD"). As a 
condition of his employment in the securities industry, 
Nicholsberg executed a "Uniform Application for Securities 
Industry Registration or Transfer" (universally referred to as 
"Form U-4"), which both he and an agent for First Liberty 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. This statement is drawn from the parties' briefs and the district 
court's unreported opinion, available at 1997 WL 312123 (E.D. Pa. June 
3). 
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signed. Among other things, Form U-4 required Nicholsberg 
to "arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy" that might 
arise between him and First Liberty "that is required to be 
arbitrated under the rules, constitutions or by-laws" of 
NASD. Form U-4 thus incorporates by reference the NASD 
Code of Arbitration Procedures (the "NASD Code"). 
 
On March 11, 1996 the parties entered into the OSJ 
Principal Agreement (the "Agreement"), under which First 
Liberty agreed to provide Nicholsberg with facilities to 
execute various types of securities transactions. Two 
aspects of the Agreement are at the core of the current 
dispute: 
 
       1. It characterized Nicholsberg as an independent 
       contractor rather than as an employee of First Liberty. 
 
       2. Its provisions, looked at alone, were silent as  to 
       the arbitrability of disputes between the parties. 
 
As we have stated at the outset, on January 21, 1997 
First Liberty filed a breach of contract action against 
Nicholsberg to recover monies assertedly owed it under the 
Agreement. Shortly thereafter Nicholsberg moved to stay 
the proceeding and to compel arbitration of the claim. This 
appeal stems from the district court's denial of 
Nicholsberg's motion. We review that denial de novo (In re 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig. All Agent 
Actions ["Prudential Agents"], 133 F.3d 225, 227 n.1 (3d Cir. 
1998)). 
 
Arbitrability of the Parties' Dispute 
 
Arbitration is a creature of contract (see AT&T Techs., Inc. 
v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 
(1986)). "As a matter of contract, no party can be forced to 
arbitrate unless that party has entered into an agreement 
to do so" (PaineWebber Inc. v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507, 511 
(3d Cir. 1990)). And as we recently observed in Prudential 
Agents, 133 F.3d at 228: 
 
       A threshold inquiry under the Federal Arbitration Act 
       is to determine, under recognized principles of contract 
       law, the validity of, and the parties bound by, the 
       arbitration agreement. 
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Here Nicholsberg's Form U-4 supplies such a potentially 
applicable agreement (at least on his part): 
 
       I agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy 
       that may arise between me and my firm, or a 
       customer, or any other person, that is required to be 
       arbitrated under the rules, constitutions, or by-laws of 
       the [NASD] as may be amended from time to time.... 
 
For its part, although one of First Liberty's authorized 
agents also signed Form U-4, it is not a direct party to that 
document.2 Rather Form U-4 is more correctly understood 
as a contract between Nicholsberg and NASD, not between 
Nicholsberg and First Liberty (Prudential Agents, 133 F.3d 
at 228 n.5, citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 
500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2 (1991)). 
 
That, however, does not prove fatal to Nicholsberg's 
request for arbitration. As we went on to say in Prudential 
Agents, 133 F.3d at 229, quoting Kaplan v. First Options of 
Chicago, Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1512 (3d Cir. 1994), aff'd, 514 
U.S. 938 (1995): 
 
       The identification of the parties bound by the 
       agreement to arbitrate need not be confined to the 
       limited inquiry of identifying the signatories to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Here is what First Liberty represented, as Form U-4 required: 
 
       To the best of my knowledge and belief, the applicant is currently 
       bonded where required, and, at the time of approval, will be 
familiar 
       with the statute(s), constitution(s), rules and by-laws of the 
agency 
       jurisdiction or civil regulatory organization with which this 
       application is being filed, and the rules governing registered 
       persons, and will be fully qualified for the position for which 
       application is being made herein. I agree that, notwithstanding the 
       approval of such agency, jurisdiction or organization which hereby 
       is requested, I will not employ the applicant in the capacity 
stated 
       herein without first receiving the approval of any authority which 
       may be required by law. This firm has communicated with all of the 
       applicant's previous employers for the past three years. 
 
[Past employer information] 
 
       IN ADDITION I HAVE TAKEN APPROPRIATE STEPS TO VERIFY THE 
       ACCURACY AND COMPLETENESS OF THE INFORMATION 
       CONTAINED IN AND WITH THIS APPLICATION. 
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       arbitration agreement. Rather, the dispositive finding is 
       an " `express' and `unequivocal' " agreement between 
       parties to arbitrate their disputes. 
 
In this instance the requisite intent on First Liberty's part 
to resort to arbitration is provided by its post-Form U-4 
entry into the Agreement with Nicholsberg. Despite its 
labeling of Nicholsberg as an "independent contractor" (of 
which more later), the Agreement goes on to say in terms 
that are both express and unequivocal: 
 
       Nevertheless, for fulfillment of this contract and for the 
       mutual benefit of both parties it is necessary that both 
       parties at all times fully comply with applicable 
       regulations of the...NASD. 
 
Thus, entirely without reference to Nicholsberg's 
undertaking in the Form U-4, the terms of the Agreement 
(committed to by both First Liberty and Nicholsberg) clearly 
incorporate by reference all requirements applicable to their 
relationship as imposed by NASD. And it is equally clear 
that such incorporation by reference necessarily 
encompasses the NASD Code, if and to the extent that it 
covers their relationship. Indeed, even in the absence of 
such a commitment in the Agreement, it has long been 
established (see, e.g., Axelrod & Co. v. Kordich, Victor & 
Neufeld, 451 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1971)) that, with NASD 
being a self-regulating organization within the terms of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"), each of its 
members such as First Liberty is contractually bound by its 
regulations--including all of its arbitration provisions. 
 
Before we turn to those NASD Code provisions, we pause 
to dispatch First Liberty's contention that because the 
later-signed Agreement contains an integration clause, it 
somehow acts to supersede the earlier-dated Form U-4. If 
Nicholsberg had to rely on First Liberty's limited 
involvement in the Form U-4 (as he does not), he could 
point to the principle expressed in Zandford v. Prudential- 
Bache Sec., Inc., 112 F.3d 723, 727 (4th Cir. 1997), quoting 
Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery 
Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243, 255 (1977): 
 
       When a party seeking to avoid arbitration contends 
       that the clause providing for arbitration has been 
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       superseded by some other agreement, "the 
       presumptions favoring arbitrability must be negated 
       expressly or by clear implication." 
 
But any potential issue involving the Form U-4 is really a 
red herring. What controls instead is that, as we have 
already explained, the document that contains the 
integration clause--the Agreement itself--incorporates by 
reference the NASD Code and thus contractually obligates 
both First Liberty and Nicholsberg to arbitrate certain 
disputes. 
 
We return then to the coverage of the NASD Code's 
arbitration mandate. Two of its Rules are particularly 
relevant here. 
 
First, "Section 1 [now Rule 10101 as the result of a 
subsequent amendment] defines the general universe of 
issues that may be arbitrated" (Armijo v. Prudential Ins. Co. 
of Am., 72 F.3d 793, 798 (10th Cir. 1995)). Under Rule 
10101 matters eligible for submission to arbitration 
include: 
 
       any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or in 
       connection with the business of any member of the 
       [NASD], or arising out of the employment or 
       termination of employment of the associated person(s) 
       with any member...: 
 
* * * 
 
       (b) between or among members and associated 
       persons.... 
 
Next, "Section 8 [now Rule 10201(a) as the result of the 
same amendment] describes a subset of that universe of 
disputes that must be arbitrated under the Code" (Armijo, 
72 F.3d at 798): 
 
       Any dispute, claim, or controversy eligible for 
       submission under the Rule 10100 Series between or 
       among members and/or associated persons, and/or 
       certain others, arising in connection with the business 
       of such member(s) or in connection with the activities 
       of such associated person(s), or arising out of the 
       employment or termination of employment of such 
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       associated person(s) with such member, shall be 
       arbitrated under this Code, at the instance of: 
 
* * * 
 
       (2) a member against a person associated with a 
       member or a person associated with a member 
       against a member.... 
 
Thus the NASD Code imposes two requirements for a 
securities industry dispute to be arbitrable. First is a 
restriction on the parties: In terms relevant to the present 
situation, the dispute must be "between...members and 
associated persons." Second is a restriction on the subject 
matter: All of the substantive disputes must be ones 
"arising in connection with the business" of members or 
arising "in connection with the activities of such associated 
person(s)" or "arising out of the employment or termination 
of employment of such associated person(s) with such 
member." We consider each requirement in turn. 
 
Are the Parties Subject to Arbitration Vis-a-Vis 
Each Other? 
 
Whether the present litigants are parties whose disputes 
with each other are arbitrable at all is a function of the 
NASD Code's Rule 10101 mandate that extends to the 
arbitration of disputes "between...members and associated 
persons." It is undisputed that First Liberty is a member of 
NASD. At issue instead is the other half of the necessary 
arbitration twosome: whether Nicholsberg qualifies as an 
"associated person" within the scope of that mandate. 
 
NASD By-Law Art. I(q) defines the term "associated 
person of a member" as: 
 
       every sole proprietor, partner, officer, director, or 
       branch manager of any member, or any natural person 
       occupying a similar status or performing similar 
       functions, or any natural person engaged in the 
       investment banking or securities business who is 
       directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by such 
       member.... 
 
That "associated person" concept did not originate with 
NASD--relatedly the 1934 Act, which provides the authority 
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for an individual exchange's self-regulating rules (Kaplan, 
19 F.3d at 1517), defines "person associated with a 
member" or "associated person of a member" to mean (15 
U.S.C. S 78c(a)(21)): 
 
       any partner, officer, director, or branch manager of 
       such member (or any person occupying a similar 
       status or performing similar functions), any person 
       directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under 
       common control with such member, or any employee of 
       such member. 
 
Analysis of the parties' relationship discloses that 
Nicholsberg plainly qualifies as an associated person within 
the meaning of both the NASD Code and the 1934 Act. That 
conclusion flows from the record's disclosure that when 
First Liberty initiated this lawsuit, Nicholsberg was both 
(1) a natural person engaged in the securities business who 
was "directly or indirectly...controlled by" NASD member 
First Liberty and (2) a natural person "performing similar 
functions" to those of a "branch manager" of First Liberty. 
Either of those satisfies the "associated person" definition. 
 
To resist that conclusion, First Liberty urges that 
Nicholsberg cannot be an "associated person" because the 
Agreement specifically labels him as an independent 
contractor. That characterization, however, is not 
controlling in the face of the conflicting reality, as gleaned 
both from First Liberty's own depiction of the parties' linked 
relationship in various paragraphs of its Complaint and 
from provisions of the Agreement itself. 
 
Here are some relevant portions of First Liberty's 
Complaint against Nicholsberg: 
 
       7. Pursuant to the Agreement, First Liberty and 
       Nicholsberg agreed that First Liberty would provide 
       facilities to Nicholsberg for execution of transactions.... 
 
       8. First Liberty appointed Nicholsberg's office as an 
       entity allowed under the provisions of the Agreement to 
       offer and solicit the sales of securities. 
 
       9. Pursuant to the Agreement, First Liberty gave 
       Nicholsberg geographic exclusivity in the New York, 
       New York metropolitan area and agreed not to open 
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       competing offices without the prior written consent of 
       Nicholsberg.... 
 
And those undisputed allegations about the nature of the 
parties' relationship conjoin with other provisions in the 
Agreement in which: 
 
       1. Nicholsberg agreed to comply with and abide by all 
       of the policies and rules included in First Liberty's 
       Policy and Procedures Manuals. 
 
       2. Nicholsberg agreed that his office would not mail 
       any correspondence or cause any advertising pertaining 
       to securities solicitation without securing the prior 
       approval of a First Liberty compliance officer. 
 
       3. Nicholsberg promised not to engage in a securit y 
       transaction of any nature with any individual or 
       broker-dealer other than through First Liberty. 
 
To be sure, other provisions in the Agreement might 
perhaps successfully avert a finding that an agency 
relationship exists for purposes of imposing respondeat 
superior liability on First Liberty, but that is not the 
relevant inquiry here (and is a matter on which we express 
no view). What rather controls is that the parties' total 
relationship, including the limitations placed by First 
Liberty both on Nicholsberg's conduct of his business and 
on its own conduct of business, amount to at least indirect 
control and also to placing Nicholsberg in much the same 
practical position that would be occupied by a branch 
manager in charge of First Liberty's only New York 
metropolitan area office. And that in turn means that 
notwithstanding the Agreement's use of "independent 
contractor" and its disclaimer of an "agent" relationship, 
Nicholsberg was an "associated person" as to First Liberty.3 
 
Indeed, if broker-dealers could escape the NASD 
arbitration requirements simply by calling someone acting 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. This just-completed application of the substance-over-form principle is 
reminiscent of the rejection of the tyranny of labels traditionally 
attributed to Abraham Lincoln: 
 
       If you call a tail a leg, how many legs has a dog? Five? No, 
calling 
       a tail a leg don't make it a leg. 
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in Nicholsberg's capacity an independent contractor, they 
could easily frustrate NASD's firm policy of submitting 
industry disputes to binding arbitration. In sum, we 
conclude that First Liberty and Nicholsberg fall within the 
class of adversaries subject to mandatory arbitration under 
their contractual relationship, the former by virtue of its 
NASD membership and the latter as an associated person 
of a member. 
 
Scope of the Parties' Arbitrable Disputes 
 
With that issue having been resolved, the final analytical 
step is to ascertain whether the present dispute falls within 
the scope of the relevant arbitration clause. In that regard 
we are guided by settled principles of federal arbitration 
law. 
 
Congress' adoption of the Act was intended to "revers[e] 
centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements" 
(Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974)) and 
to replace that hostility with "a liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements" (Moses H. Cone Mem'l 
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). 
Hence any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues 
must be resolved in favor of arbitration (id. at 24-25; 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrsyler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614, 626 (1985)). As we stated two decades ago in 
Bristol Farmers Mkt. & Auction Co. v. Arlen Realty & Dev. 
Corp., 589 F.2d 1214, 1219 (3d Cir. 1978), quoting United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. , 363 
U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960): 
 
       An order to arbitrate...should not be denied unless it 
       may be said with positive assurance that the 
       arbitration clause is not susceptible of an 
       interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts 
       should be resolved in favor of coverage. 
 
In light of those principles (or even without our having to 
invoke them), it takes only a brief look at the nature of First 
Liberty's claim to confirm that it falls well within the scope 
of the parties' commitment to arbitration. 
 
First Liberty attempts to resist that result by positing 
that its breach of contract claim arises solely from the 
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Agreement and does not implicate Form U-4. From that 
premise it seeks to conclude that even if the NASD Code 
requires arbitration of pertinent disputes arising from the 
latter document, there is no basis for requiring arbitration 
in this case. But again the purported Form U-4 issue is a 
nonissue: First Liberty's contention is scotched by our 
earlier determinations (1) that the Agreement itse lf includes 
an incorporation by reference of the NASD Code and 
(2) that the Code requires the arbitration of busi ness 
disputes between members (in this instance First Liberty) 
and their associated persons (in this instance Nicholsberg). 
 
Conclusion 
 
As stated at the outset of this opinion, we REVERSE the 
district court's order denying Nicholsberg's motion to stay 
the proceedings and REMAND the matter to the district 
court with directions to order the parties to proceed to 
arbitration forthwith. 
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